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Abstract: The vicissitudes of British imperial divestment after 1945 require scholars to explore 
systematically the United States’ role in reshaping the contours of the British Empire. According to 
William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'the post-war Empire was more than British and less 
than an imperium ... it was nationalized and internationalized as part of the Anglo-American 
coalition. US foreign policy after 1945 was directed not only at forging a North Atlantic coalition 
which would 'contain' die Warsaw Pact, but also at collaborating in die management of the political 
and economic changes that swept die non-European world. The history of international relations 
since 1945 has been defined by the 'end of empire' - whether Belgian, British, French, Italian, 
Japanese, Portuguese, or Soviet. As each empire has disintegrated, US influence has been extended 
during, and through, die process of imperial disengagement. In some cases, for example the 
Japanese mandates acquired at the end of die Second World War, die extension of US influence led 
to formal control. In others, as in Jordan, Morocco, Indonesia, and die former Belgian Congo, the 
United States has used military and/or economic aid to fashion an 'informal empire', to borrow die 
term popularized by Robinson and John Gallagher. The transfer of power in British Guiana 
between 1961 and 1964 illustrates Louis and Robinson's claim that British imperial disengagement 
was managed by the Anglo-American coalition. It shows how die two powers constantly 
(re)negotiated die terms of their relationship in various parts of the world in order to maintain their 
strategic partnership. And it shows how British disengagement created the conditions for US 
control. In effect, die transfer of power in British Guiana was not simply the accession to office in 
an independent country by the nationalist elite; it also transferred control of the country's political 
system and economic and foreign policy to the United States. As Louis and Robinson observe, 
'Kennedy's "New Frontier" began where Europe's imperial frontiers had ended.
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THE VICISSITUDES OF British imperial divestment after 1945 require scholars to explore systematically the United States's role in re­shaping the contours of the British Empire. According to William 
Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'the post-war Empire was more than 
British and less than an imperium ... it was nationalized and inter­
nationalized as part of the Anglo-American coalition.'1 US foreign policy 
after 1945 was directed not only at forging a Nordi Atlantic coalition which 
would 'contain' die Warsaw Pact, but also at collaborating in die manage­
ment of the political and economic changes that swept die non-European 
world. The history of international relations since 1945 has been denned 
by the 'end of empire' - whedier Belgian, British, French, Italian, Japan­
ese, Portuguese, or Soviet. As each empire has disintegrated, US influence 
has been extended during, and through, die process of imperial disengage­
ment. In some cases, for example the Japanese mandates acquired at the 
end of die Second World War, die extension of US influence led to formal 
control. In odiers, as in Jordan, Morocco, Indonesia, and die former Bel­
gian Congo, the United States has used military and/or economic aid to 
fashion an 'informal empire', to borrow die term popularized by Robinson 
and John Gallagher.2 
The transfer of power in British Guiana between 1961 and 1964 illus­
trates Louis and Robinson's claim diat British imperial disengagement was 
managed by the Anglo-American coalition. It shows how die two powers 
constantly (re)negotiated die terms of their relationship in various parts of 
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the world in order to maintain their strategic partnership. And it shows 
how British disengagement created the conditions for US control. In 
effect, die transfer of power in British Guiana was not simply the accession 
to office in an independent country by the nationalist elite; it also trans­
ferred control of the country's political system and economic and foreign 
policy to the United States. As Louis and Robinson observe, 'Kennedy's 
"New Frontier" began where Europe's imperial frontiers had ended.'1 
* * * 
British Guiana emerged as a 'problem' in post-war Anglo-American rela­
tions in 1953, during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, when it 
held its first national election based upon universal suffrage. After the 
nationalist People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, swept 
the elections and escalated its challenge to British colonial rule, the col­
ony's first popularly elected government was removed by British troops on 
the pretext that it was planning a Communist takeover. The Eisenhower 
administration endorsed the action and agreed to help to finance the 
colony's development in an effort to discredit the nationalist leadership.2 
Thus, well before John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, British Guiana had 
become a site for collaboration in managing the challenge of non-European 
nationalism to British colonial rule. 
Despite their collaboration, the two powers failed to prevent die PPP 
from winning the general election of 1957 or to fashion a viable political 
alternative. At the time die Eisenhower administration left office, Jagan was 
expected to lead his party to victory in the elections scheduled for mid-
1961. In fact, at Britain's urging, die Eisenhower administration had begun 
a grudging accommodation with Jagan, who recognized that he had no 
choice but to court Britain's goodwill. 
By the time the PPP returned to office in 1957, it had moderated its 
political agenda and style. In 1955, die leadership split when the moderates 
led by Forbes Burnham broke away after a failed attempt to seize control. 
Jagan and his American-born wife, Janet, née Rosenberg, whom he met 
while a student at Northwestern University, held on to the leadership. A 
further split occurred when three leading left-wingers, Rory Westmaas, 
Sydney King, and Martin Carter, were expelled in 1957. Their expulsion, 
partly an attempt to placate die British, opened die way to a rapproche­
ment widi die colonial audiorities in die period leading to independence. 
1 Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism of Decolonization', p. 495. 
2 For US policy towards British Guiana, see C. Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-CoUmialism: The UnitedStates 
and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1Q40-Ô4 (Westport, 1994). Some records pertaining to 
this episode at the Public Record Office have not been released and the CIA claims that its records of 
the covert operation it mounted in British Guiana have been destroyed. See 'CIA Destroyed Files on 
1953 Iran Coup', New York Times, 29 May 1997. 
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By i960, Britain was making preparations to hand over an independent 
British Guiana to the PPP.1 
The Kennedy administration, however, was less enthusiastic. According 
to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report submitted to the US Intel­
ligence Board in March 1961, Jagan might try after independence to set up 
'an avowed[ly] Communist regime ... More likely ... an independent 
Jagan government would seek to portray itself as an instrument of reformist 
nationalism which would gradually move in the direction of [Fidel] 
Castro's Cuba. Such a regime would almost certainly be strongly encour­
aged and supported by Castro and the [Soviet] Bloc' The assessment of 
the British as unwilling 'to interfere with political developments in British 
Guiana'2 was seconded by Rockwood Foster, the West Indies desk officer 
in the state department, who visited Georgetown in February 1961, and to 
whom the governor admitted that Britain 'would like to get out of the busi­
ness of running die country as gracefully and honorably as possible'.3 The 
imminence of independence left the United States wondering whether the 
colony would join wiui Cuba and challenge US influence in the Americas. 
Equating the PPP and Jagan with Cuba and Castro illustrates the trau­
matic effect of the Cuban revolution upon US policy-makers. For the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the revolution was an affront to 
US claims to leadership. Castro's repudiation, by aligning with the Soviet 
Union, of die quasi-colonial relationship with the United States arising out 
of the Spanish-American War of 1898, pointed to the fragility of the United 
States's informal empire in the Western Hemisphere. The radicalization of 
the revolution, and Cuba's decision to seek political, economic, and mili­
tary support from the Communist powers, undermined US efforts to en­
force the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean. These developments illus­
trated the growing weight of die Soviet Union in international affairs. US 
efforts since the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 to confine Soviet influence 
to Eastern Europe had failed to prevent die Soviet Union from penetrating 
an acknowledged US sphere of influence, while the fiasco at the Bay of 
Pigs in 1961 demonstrated the US failure to reimpose its authority over 
Cuba by reintegrating it into its informal Caribbean empire. 
Given die perceived erosion of informal US imperial sway in the Carib­
bean, the transfer of power in British Guiana became of critical import­
ance. With elections due in August 1961 to choose a government to lead 
die colony to independence, the Kennedy administration wished to leave 
Britain in no doubt of its dislike of die ties between the Jagans and Cuba.4 
1 Memo of con., 16 Feb. 1961, FforeignJ Relations of the] Ufnited] S[tates], 1961-3, xii. 513. 
2 Special National Intelligence Estimate, 21 March 1961, ibid., pp. 515-17. 
3 Memo of con., Georgetown, 16 Feb. 1961, ibid., p. 513. 
4 Bowles, state dept. instruction to embassy, London, 24 March 1961 [College Park, United States 
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The National Security Council (NSC) proposed in May tiiat the United 
States and Britain should plan a joint strategy for British Guiana. Although 
die British disagreed about the sort of'reasonable government' to be put in 
place during the transfer of power, they were diought to be willing to take 
advice.1 
The divergence of views had been evident on several occasions. In 
April, the Americans continued to express their concerns to the British 
about die possibility of a Jagan victory in die elections. Kennedy had raised 
die issue widi die prime minister, Harold Macmillan; the secretary of state, 
Dean Rusk, with the foreign secretary, die earl of Home; and the US 
ambassador at London, David Bruce, widi die colonial secretary, Reginald 
Maudling. The British replied diat diey were unwilling 'to undertake any 
operation or permit us [die United States, to] undertake operation to pre­
vent [a] Jagan victory'.2 They assumed diat Jagan was salvageable. During 
a visit to Washington in April 1961, Grey met with officials of the CIA, 
including the director, Richard Helms. Grey told his audience that 'the 
Jagans [were] persons widi whom die British could work' and diat he con­
sidered Burnham racist and untrustwordiy.3 Given the resistance, Rusk, 
less dian two weeks before die elections in British Guiana, sent a personal 
appeal to Home stressing diat Jagan's 'accession to power would be a most 
troublesome sedoack in diis Hemisphere'. Rusk again urged Home to see 
whedier there was anydiing die British or Americans could do to 'forestall 
such an eventuality'.4 
Rusk's letter betrayed the Kennedy administration's resentment of the 
British decision to support Jagan, despite its fear diat he would prove to be 
anodier Castro. It ended widi die veiled direat: 'I am taking the liberty of 
urging you to have a look because of the foreign policy ramifications of a 
Jagan victory. It would cause us acute embarrassments widi inevitable 
irritations to Anglo-American relations. I do not refer in diis last point to 
official circles but to problems of public and Congressional opinion.'5 
Rusk's concerns about congressional opinion were not misplaced. Senator 
Thomas Dodd (D-Connecticut), a rabidly anti-Communist senior senator 
widi die audiority to embarrass the administration, co-authored a letter to 
Kennedy with Senator Ernest Gruening (R-Alaska) in which they ques­
tioned die administration's policy towards British Guiana.6 
National Archives, Record Group 59], S[tate] Department] D[ecimal] F[ile] 741D.00/3-2461. 
1 Battle to Bundy, 19 May 1961, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 517-18. 
2 State dept. to Rusk (Paris), tel., 5 Aug. 1961, ibid., p. 519. 
3 See memo for die record, 'Visit to Washington of Sir Ralph Grey, Governor of British Guiana', 28 
April 1961 [Boston], J[ohn] F[.] K[ennedy] L[ibrary],SchlesingerW[hite] H[ouse] File, box WH-5A. 
4 State dept. to embassy, London, tel., 11 Aug. 1961, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 519-20. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Dodd and Gruening to Kennedy, 6 Sept. 1961, JFKL, W[hite] H[ouse] C[entral] Ffiles], British 
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Home replied on 18 August that 'the possibilities of taking action to 
influence the results of the election' had already been discussed, but little 
could be done. As the safeguards built into British Guiana's new constitu­
tion gave Britain control during the transition to independence, Home 
recommended working with Jagan as the best means of maintaining West­
ern influence: 
No one can say for certain how Jagan will behave if he is returned to power. He is a 
confused thinker and his mind is clogged with ill-digested dogma derived from 
Marxist literature. But he has learnt a good deal in the last eight years; he has not, 
since 1957, proved as difficult to deal with as he was earlier. It is true that he has 
during the election campaign made it clear mat he expects to strengthen his rela­
tions with Cuba, and he has at times shown an interest in the possibilities of trade 
and aid with the Soviet bloc. But he has also, during the election, promised to seek 
further aid from the United States; and, if we in the West show a real willingness to 
try to help, we think it by no means impossible mat British Guiana may end up in 
a position not very different from mat of India.1 
As the Kennedy administration debated whether to work with Jagan as 
Home suggested, early in August the state department instructed the US 
consul general at Georgetown, Everett Melby, to monitor die fortunes of 
the leading opposition parties — the United Force (UF) and the People's 
National Congress (PNC) - and to gather information on the activities of 
private American groups, in particular the support that World Harvest 
Evangelism Inc., headed by Dr Lloyd Sweet, was giving to the UF.2 
Founded in i960 by a wealdiy entrepreneur of Portuguese extraction, 
Peter D'Aguiar, to represent the European (predominandy Portuguese) 
and other business groups, die UF had failed to reach agreement with 
Burnham's PNC, which represented the majority of the Afro-Guyanese 
who constituted the colony's second-largest ethnic group. Burnham's re­
sponse in April 1961 to calls for closer collaboration between the PNC and 
the UF was to threaten to leave die party. He explained in an open letter 
that, 'ideologically and philosophically, there is nothing in common 
between die PNC and die UF.'3 
The existence of political parties representing ethnic communities 
which distrusted each odier was die distinctive feature of the election cam­
paign. Multiracial in 1953, by 1961 die PPP was largely based in the rural 
Indian community of sugar workers, rice farmers, and small businessmen. 
Guiana, box 43. For DooM's attempts to influence the Kennedy administration's policy in the Congo, 
see R. D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983), pp. 110,146. 
1 Home to Rusk, 18 Aug. 1961, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 521-2. 
2 Ball to Melby, tel., 7 Aug. 1961, JFKL, N[ational] S[ecurity] F[iles], countries, box 14A. 
3 L. F. S. Burnham, letter, Sunday Chronicle (Guyana), 9 April 1961. 
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The PNC drew its support from urban areas and the working- and middle-
class black communities that dominated the civil service, the teaching 
profession, and the service industries. The UF represented mosdy middle-
class and commercial groups dominated by Europeans, Christian Indians, 
and the Amerindian communities in which the Roman Catholic and Angli­
can Churches enjoyed long-established influence. 
Britain's aim, while working with Jagan, was to try to ensure a strong op­
position to hold the PPP in check. In preparation for the elections, there­
fore, a British commission had redrawn the constituency boundaries to the 
disadvantage of the PPP, which complained about them. Nonetheless, after 
a bitter election campaign in which both the PNC and the UF portrayed 
the PPP as Communist, and in which race played the crucial role, die PPP 
won twenty seats, die PNC eleven, and the UF only four. With only 42 per 
cent of die vote, die PPP nonedieless obtained a legislative majority. 
The bitter campaign exacerbated the rivalry between the leadership of 
the PNC and the UF. The PPP had helped to weaken the moderately 
socialist PNC by ordering its supporters to vote for the capitalist UF in 
constituencies where the PPP did not field a candidate, even though die 
UF was labelling the PPP as Communist.1 The tacit collaboration demon­
strated the strengdi of anti-black sentiment that shaped bodi the PPP's and 
the UF's electoral strategies. Although the PNC and die PPP portrayed 
themselves as pro-labour, the PPP supported the party of the business 
community radier than die party representing the black working classes. 
Ideological labels could not obscure the fact that electoral politics in 
British Guiana were based upon strategies of ethnic mobilization diat did 
little to cement national cohesion and opened up opportunities for sub­
sequent US intervention. 
Prior to die elections, the PNC's general secretary, Sydney King, had 
proposed dividing British Guiana into separate electoral zones along edinic 
lines. Aldiough the party prompdy expelled him, the proposal illustrates 
the fragmentation of die colony's political community. Similarly, after the 
election, D'Aguiar, in conversation widi Melby, raised the possibility diat 
the regions bordering on Venezuela and Brazil in which the UF had 
established itself as the majority party might secede.2 The election result 
dius revealed the PPP's appeal to the largely rural Indian population, its 
lack of strong support among the other ethnic communities, and its 
inability to win a majority of the popular vote. It also demonstrated diat die 
opposition parties, even with electoral boundaries redrawn in dieir favour, 
1 Melby to Rusk, tel., 25 Aug. 1961, JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
2 T . J. Spinner Jr., A Political and Social History of Guyana, ig4$-8o (Boulder, 1984), p. 79; Melby to 
Rusk, tel., 25 Aug. 1961, JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14 A. 
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could not unseat the PPP. The results therefore both personally and polit­
ically vindicated Jagan and the PPP, and heightened racial tensions. 
The central issue facing the PPP at home was maintaining the impetus 
necessary to achieve independence while presiding over a severely frac­
tured population. The election campaign had exacerbated the bitter rivalry 
between the party leaders; Burnham stated his aim both to bring down the 
PPP government and destroy die UF and D'Aguiar. His critics saw him as 
the biggest obstacle to uniting the opposition and responsible for the fail­
ure to oust the PPP despite winning more votes.1 They now feared being 
permanendy marginalized if the country became independent under the 
Indian-dominated PPP. 
Immediately after the PPP victory, Rusk, dismayed, asked Home to 
arrange a meeting in London. In addition to politics, economics, and intel­
ligence, Rusk emphasized that he attached 'importance to the covert side': 
he reminded Home that Britain had agreed in June to 'have another look at 
what could be done in this field after the election'. Home accepted the 
offer to devise a joint strategy for British Guiana but, according to Rusk, 
warned him 'that the emphasis must be in the political and economic 
spheres if we are to expect rewarding dividends'.2 Although the elections 
in British Guiana had not bridged the gap between the British and US 
governments about how to deal with Jagan, they agreed to try jointly to 
manage Britain's wididrawal from a US sphere of influence. 
Although Home preferred to co-opt Jagan and the PPP, Rusk explored 
die alternatives. Melby returned to Washington immediately after die elec­
tions to help to shape the program - submitted to Kennedy in late August 
- the state department would discuss with die British. The state depart­
ment recommended that the United States should offer economic and 
technical assistance to British Guiana; sponsor, after independence, its 
membership in the Organization of American States and die Alliance for 
Progress; and invite Jagan to meet Kennedy during a visit to the United 
States planned for October. At die same time, die administration should 
launch a covert programme to 'expose and destroy Communists in British 
Guiana, including, if necessary, "the possibility of finding a substitute for 
Jagan himself, who could command East Indian support"'. The presi­
dent's special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, commented that the two 
halves of the program contradicted one anodier and revealed the depth of 
the state department's distrust of bodi Jagan and British policy towards 
Bridsh Guiana.3 
1 Melby to state dept., tels. 48, 52,25 Aug. 1961, JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
2 State depL to embassy, London, tel., 26 Aug., 2 Sept. 1961, FRUS, jo6i-3,xii. 522-3,527-8. 
3 Schlesinger to Kennedy, 30 Aug. 1961, ibid., pp. 524-5. 
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After Kennedy had reviewed the program, Rusk instructed Bruce in 
London to go ahead with the meetings to which Home had agreed. Rusk 
told Bruce that although the United States was willing to try to 'salvage' 
Jagan, nonetheless 'it is only prudent to put out certain anchors to wind­
ward.' The administration wanted to discuss the possibility of new elec­
tions before independence, and to be assured that the governor would use 
his reserved powers in an emergency. The covert program should be 
covered with the fig leaf that the administration had yet to approve it. In 
supplementary instructions, Rusk explained that 'we continue to have 
serious reservations about British assessment [of] Jagan as set forth in 
London talks in April.. . and in conversation here widi Governor Grey ... 
In our view, we should keep in mind possibility [that] Jagan is Communist-
controlled "sleeper" who will move to establish Castro or Communist 
regime upon independence.n 
Rusk admitted that 'we have deliberately refrained up to now from 
intimating to British [that] we [are] prepared to try their prescription for 
handling Jagan. We hope this card will serve as leverage to obtain British 
agreement to our action program as a whole.' According to the colonial 
office, US officials were reluctant even to allow Jagan to visit the United 
States until the British government approved 'as a whole' the recommen­
dations of the Anglo-American Working Party which met in September 
1961.2 
Schlesinger criticized Rusk's instructions to Bruce on die grounds that 
they might lead to Kennedy's policy being misconstrued. He objected to 
the description of Jagan as a 'sleeper' and the implication that the adminis­
tration was making a less-than-sincere effort 'to tie an independent British 
Guiana politically and economically to [the western] hemisphere'.3 The 
deputy under-secretary of state for political affairs, Alexis Johnson, sought 
to reassure him. The state department planned to tell Bruce that 'basic to 
our entire program is the determination to make a college try to tie Jagan to 
the West'; that it was worried nonetheless about Britain's willingness 'to 
brush aside reports ofjagan's communist connections'.4 
The contretemps revealed both the ambivalence within the Kennedy 
administration and the state department's determination to keep its 
options open. The United States was obsessed with ensuring that, once 
independent, British Guiana should be firmly tied down as a US client. 
Rusk ignored Home's suggestion that, under Jagan, it should be allowed to 
follow India's lead: non-alignment was not an acceptable status for a Carib-
1 State dept. to embassy, London, tel., 4, 5 Sept. 1961, FRUS, 1061-5, xii. 528-9. 
2 Thomas to Grey, 27 Sept. 1961 [Kew, Public Record Office], F[oreign] 0[ffice Records] 371/155422. 
3 Schlesinger to Johnson, 7 Sept. 1961, FRUS,ig6i-$, xii. 531. 
4 Johnson to Schlesinger, 9 Sept. 1961, ibid., p. 532. 
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bean country lest it should dirow up another 'Communist' government in 
the Western Hemisphere.1 Rusk was determined both to control Britain's 
disengagement from British Guiana and to ensure that it was securely 
anchored within the US sphere of influence in the Caribbean. One pos­
sible explanation of his attitude may be his awareness of the debilitating 
consequences of the 'Who lost China?' debate for the state department 
when he served as assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs in die 
Truman administration. The Cuban revolution had been similarly dama­
ging to die Republicans in the i960 campaign, and Rusk may have begun 
to fear the possible political impact of an independent British Guiana 
under Jagan on the 1964 presidential election. 
As a result of the discussions in London in September, the United States 
agreed to work in tandem widi the British in trying to 'salvage' Jagan. The 
state department explained to Melby that the 'basic concept of new pro­
gram is whole-hearted cross the board effort to cooperate with newly 
elected administration headed by Jagan and to foster effective association 
between British Guiana and die West'. Melby should present the policy as 
a recognition of British Guiana's approaching independence, not as the 
result of Anglo-American co-ordination; should offer development aid; 
and should invite Jagan to meet Kennedy during his visit to the United 
States in October.2 
The reasons given for die decision to work widi Jagan were: '(a) imprac-
ticality of any alternative cause of action; (b) dearth of effective political 
leadership apart from Jagan; and (c) recognition that coldness towards 
Jagan and widiholding of aid could only accelerate his gravitation toward 
Soviet-Castro bloc'.3 Despite having reservations about Jagan's ideological 
predilections, the Kennedy administration seemed to have decided that it 
had litde choice but to collaborate with the British in working with the 
PPP as British Guiana took the final steps towards independence. 
Jagan himself, coached by Grey, sought to assure die Kennedy adminis­
tration of his willingness to co-operate. He stated that the PPP was not 
Communist, promised to adhere to the rules of parliamentary democracy, 
and asked to join die Alliance for Progress. He left his wife - his key party 
organizer - out of the cabinet and, to overcome die perception of the PPP 
as a party of the Indian community, chose several members from odier edi-
nic groups. Even die British Guiana Trades Union Congress (BGTUC), 
which opposed the PPP, stated its wilhngness to work with the new 
1 Neither Husk nor his biographers acknowledge his role. See R. Rusk, As I Saw It: By Dean Rusk As 
Told To Richard Rusk (New York, 1990) and T. J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk 
in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988). 
2 Bowles to Melby, tel., 25 Sept. 1961, JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
3 Bowles to US embassy, Ottawa, tel., 29 Sept 1961, ibid. 
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government. Before leaving for the United States on 12 October, Jagan 
stated that he hoped to use the trip to overcome reservations about his 
leadership and to forge a new relationship with the United States. He did 
not expect his 'socialist leanings' to stand in the way, as the United States 
was already giving aid to Yugoslavia and Poland. It was evident that Jagan 
was determined to reassure the Kennedy administration that an independ­
ent British Guiana under his leadership would not constitute a direat to the 
United States; that the pragmatism that informed the US approach to 
Eastern Europe should be extended to British Guiana.1 
The Kennedy administration, too, hoped diat Jagan's visit to Washing­
ton would assuage the fears of both sides: the meeting itself, followed by 
the carrot of US development aid, would help to bring British Guiana 
under the US umbrella. While Jagan hoped the aid would blunt criticism 
from opponents at home who painted him as Communist and anti-
American, the offer of it would also vindicate the British strategy of con­
taining US hostility to Jagan in order to open the gate to greater influence 
after independence.2 Unfortunately for Jagan, even before he arrived in the 
United States it was evident that he and the state department had con­
flicting ideas about the scale and timing of the aid. The Kennedy admin­
istration envisaged US aid as part of a co-ordinated strategy by the Anglo-
American alliance to keep British Guiana within the Western bloc, and was 
willing to supply only part of the aid Jagan was seeking: it was also 
dependent upon iron-clad guarantees that Jagan would desist from his flir­
tation with the Communist bloc. Jagan, on the other hand, assumed that 
rapprochement with the United States would open the door to Aladdin's 
Cave. Whereas the Kennedy administration planned to provide aid in 
measured amounts, Jagan was seeking immediate large-scale commitments. 
Rusk instructed Melby on 8 October: 'You should make every effort dispel 
Jagan's unrealistic expectations. It would have unfortunate effects on pros­
pects for BG program as a whole if Jagan's hopes not deflated before his 
arrival here. Furuiermore extravagant demands by Jagan would affect most 
adversely the image which we believe he wants in his own interest create in 
US and would impede our ability to extend assistance.' Rusk added that 
the United States would offer $5 million for development, as well as a team 
of advisers to help to devise a 'realistic development program'.3 
At a meeting on 11 October with a mission from the Agency for Inter­
national Development (AID), Jagan expressed his disappointment, as he 
1 Christensen to Rusk, tel., 13 Oct.; sec. state to ARA diplomatic missions, circular tel., 4 Oct. 1961, 
JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
2 British Guiana - 'Notes for the secretary of state's talks with the US ambassador on Wed. afternoon', 
6 Sept. 1961, FO 37V155721-
3 Rusk to Melby, tel., 8 Oct. 1961,JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
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had been led to believe that the United States would lend more than $5 
million if the requests were properly supported. When the AID mission 
refused to commit itself to an amount, Jagan concluded that his requests 
would be turned down; that the strategy of reaching an entente with the 
Kennedy administration as a way of obtaining US aid would not work.1 As 
he had budgeted between $60 and $250 million for a development pro­
gram and was looking abroad for the entire amount, Jagan, acutely dis­
appointed, said that, given the gap between his expectations and the AID 
mission's offer, he would turn elsewhere. The AID mission, to whom 
Jagan's plans seemed to be 'grandiose and unrealistic bodi in amounts and 
in feasibility', took him to mean the Soviet Union.2 
After failing with the AID mission, Jagan hoped for more success with 
the state department. However, it interpreted his request as showing that 
the assumption he was 'salvageable' was unworkable. By the time he set 
out for Washington seeking a rapprochement, his critics within the Ken­
nedy administration were already trying to obtain a decision to oust him.3 
The visit satisfied neither side. Jagan explained that after independence 
British Guiana would preserve its democratic system and seek member­
ship in the Organization of American States, but its foreign policy would 
be non-aligned. He also acknowledged his belief in economic planning by 
the state, though he played it down at his meeting with Kennedy.4 
Although Jagan's unwillingness to embrace an anti-Communist strategy 
unsetded die administration,5 Kennedy was not reflexively hostile to trade 
between British Guiana and the Communist bloc, merely anxious that 
commercial ties should not lead to political dependence. He mentioned 
diat the United States itself traded widi Communist countries and gave aid 
to Yugoslavia, India, and Brazil.6 
Despite AID's recommendation that the administration should offer 
British Guiana $5 million in aid and not worry diat Jagan would seek add­
itional sums from other countries, including the Soviet Union, he left 
Washington empty-handed.7 The Kennedy administration merely offered 
to send an economic mission to Georgetown to help the PPP to draft 
applications for aid. Jagan understood that he had failed. When he asked 
1 Melby to Rusk, tel., 11,12 Oct. 1961, JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
2 USAID position paper, Jagan's visit to Washington, 23-25 Oct. 1961: 'Economic Assistance to British 
Guiana', 17 Oct. 1961, ibid. 
3 Memo, Hilsman to Johnson, 17 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-3,161. 534-6. 
4 Memo of con., 25 Oct. 1961: Subject: 'Call of Premier Jagan of British Guiana on the President', 
FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 536-8. 
5 See Spinner, Guyana, pp. 83-5 and A. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 
PP- 773-9-
6 Memo of con., 25 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 536-8. 
^ 'Economic Assistance to British Guiana', JFKL, NSF, countries, box 14A. 
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Schlesinger to explain Kennedy's unwillingness, however, Schlesinger 
replied disingenuously that the administration merely wished to examine 
the colony's development plan, and added that the administration 'defin­
itely was not stalling'.1 
Although the Kennedy administration postponed the decision whether 
to give development aid to British Guiana, it had not yet decided to over­
throw the PPP government. In November 1961, in an interview with the 
Russian newspaper, Izvestia, Kennedy stated that the United States could 
live with Marxist-led governments that came to power through fair elec­
tions.2 As he cited Jagan's victory in British Guiana, the statement implied 
that Kennedy had not publicly committed himself to overthrow its govern­
ment. He further showed his willingness to work with Jagan by authorizing 
in January 1962 $1.5 million more in technical assistance to die colony and 
by asking for die promised economic mission to be sent by 15 February.3 
This decision followed a meeting between the state department and AID 
officials on 11 January which exemplified die tussle being waged within the 
Kennedy administration. AID had decided not to fund a road-building 
project in British Guiana. Whereas the state department saw die project as 
an important symbol of the United States's willingness to work widi Jagan, 
it saw AID's decision not to fund it as an attempt to abort the strategy.4 
Meanwhile, in Britain, by late 1961 the colonial office was hoping to per­
suade the United States to take more responsibility for Britain's colonial 
territories.5 The foreign office, which agreed, recommended that Mac-
millan should raise die issue with Kennedy when they met in December at 
Bermuda. The foreign office aimed at an exchange of responsibilities: 
whereas Britain would play a larger role in Latin America, the United 
States would take over some of Britain's responsibilities to the Common­
wealth.6 As Britain envisaged wider Anglo-American collaboration, its 
policies towards British Guiana were directed at minimizing die impact of 
the colony's troubles: 
The Americans have made clear that they would welcome contributions from this 
country to their Latin American programmes in order that this should not appear 
to be exclusively American and so be prejudiced in Latin American eyes. We can­
not respond as favourably to this appeal as we would wish because of our commit­
ments in the Commonwealth. But it would obviously be easier for us to do so if a 
1 Hennings to Maudling, 27 Oct. 1961, FO 371/155724; memo of con., 26 Oct. 1961, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 
538-40-
2 Transcript of interview granted by Kennedy to Soviet Government News Agency, New York Times, 
29 Nov. 1961. 
3 Kennedy to Hamilton, 12 Jan. 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 542. 
4 Schlesinger to Kennedy, 12 Jan. 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 540-1. 
5 Williams, with ends., to Hutchinson, 18 Dec. 1961, FO 37i/i5573i-
6 Bermuda Meeting - Dec. 1961, West Indies/Latin America, supp. brief by FO, FO 371/155731. 
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larger share of the Commonwealth load could be borne by the Americans. It 
would be useful if this point could be made in discussions at Bermuda. Our 
ultimate aim would be to achieve an understanding with the Americans under 
which they took over more of our Commonwealth commitments and we took over 
a corresponding share of theirs in Latin America: but such a plan cannot be 
adopted until the agreement of other Government departments has been obtained. 
Events in British Guiana disrupted the British plans. In February 1962, 
the opposition parties decided on a test of strength owing to their fear of 
becoming independent under PPP rule. The PPP budget, drafted by die 
Cambridge economist Nicholas Kaldor, called for compulsory savings and 
higher taxes. In response, the PNC, the BGTUC, and the UF together 
backed a general strike on 16 February to force revisions to the budget, but 
which appeared to be an attempt to bring down the government. When die 
strike led to riots and arson in Georgetown, partly owing to police resent­
ment of the government, British troops in the colony, supported by odiers 
from Jamaica and Britain, were used to restore calm, after the police 
proved unable to contain the riots and a senior police officer was killed by 
gunfire.1 Although the government responded by withdrawing several of 
the provisions to which its critics had objected, Jagan also planned to set 
up an internal security force under PPP control to serve as a counterweight 
to the predominandy black police.2 The racial polarization manifest during 
the election was intensifying die political crisis. 
The crisis provided the first evidence of US co-ordination of the anti-
PPP forces in an attempt to create an effective alternative to Jagan. The 
state department acknowledged that individual Americans and US organ­
izations had been involved. But when Maudling asked whether the CIA 
had also been involved, he was assured by Schlesinger that it had not.3 
The reply may have been intended to mislead. On the day of the disturb­
ances, the acting deputy assistant secretary for Europe, William Burdett, 
invited the British chief of chancery, Dennis Greenhill, and the colonial 
attaché, John Hennings, to the state department and asked them for their 
'assessment of die current situation and UK views on the broader implica­
tions for the future of the colony'. He asked whether die British decision to 
send in troops meant that Britain planned to suspend die constitution; 
whether the PNC and the UF might make an alliance; whether the Jagan 
government might fall owing to the budget; and whether the disturbances 
would affect Britain's timetable for independence.4 Hennings reported to 
1 Grey to Maudling, 14 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161948; same to same, 15 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161947. 
2 Grey to Maudling, 20 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161947. 
3 Paper prepared in the state dept., 15 March 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 558; memo, Schlesinger to 
Bruce, 1 March 1962, ibid., pp. 550-1. 
4 Memo of con., 16 Feb. 1962, SDDF 741D.00/2-1662. 
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the colonial office that 'the events of the past week provided a convenient 
excuse to enable the Administration to get off the hook of a policy, which 
from the point of internal American politics had never been anything but 
highly unpopular.'1 Although Burdett's questions may have been designed 
to elicit the level of British commitment to Jagan, the fact diat he asked 
them within hours of the confrontation suggests that he may not have been 
surprised by what happened. 
Burdett had tried to shape events in British Guiana before the crisis 
occurred. In a secret telegram in October 1961, he told Melby that Richard 
Ishmael, the president of the BGTUC and the leader of die official union 
of sugar workers, die Man Power Citizens' Association (MPCA), was seek­
ing die AFL-CIO's support in die struggle against die 'Jaganite Communist 
threat', and added that die 'department feels best route for helping BG 
labor probably dirough international free trade union movement'.2 Burdett 
knew several mondis ahead both diat the opposition was gearing up for a 
confrontation wiui die PPP government and who might support diem. 
In the wake of the disturbances, Jagan claimed diat the UF and a section 
of the business community had conspired to bring down die government 
and, in a meeting widi Melby, accused the United States of involvement.3 
There is tantalizing evidence diat he may have been right - that die state 
department and/or the CIA were involved, notwithstanding the Kennedy 
administration's disclaimer. The New York Times reported in 1967 that the 
CIA had 'helped organize strikes in 1962 and 1963 against Dr Cheddi 
Jagan', and named the US branch of die Public Service International (PSI), 
based in London, as die channel for the aid.4 The London Sunday Times 
subsequendy carried a report naming an American, Howard McCabe, as 
the PSI's key operative in British Guiana.5 Melby reported on 20 February 
1962 that 'William' McCabe, affiliated with PSI, had called at die consulate 
that afternoon to dispel die rumours of'American labor agitators'. McCabe 
told Melby that his visit had been planned for several weeks and that he 
had come to advise the British Guiana Civil Service Association in its 
negotiations widi the government. Grey told the colonial office, on the 
strengdi of information given him by Melby, that die PSI was represented 
by Howard MacKay.6 Whatever his name, the fact that he represented die 
PSI in Georgetown during the riots suggests diat die CIA were involved, 
and used die PSI to channel the help Burdett had offered. 
1 Hennings to Thomas, 22 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161952. 
2 Burdett to Melby, 10 Oct. 1961, SDDF 841D.062/10-1061. 
3 Melby to Rusk, tel., 21 Feb. 1962, SDDF 741D.00/2-2162. 
4 'CIA Men Aided Strikes in Guiana against Dr Jagan', New York Times, 22 Feb. 1967. 
5 'How the CIA Got Rid of Jagan', Sunday Times, 16 April 1967. 
6 Melby to Rusk, 19 Feb. 1962, SDDF 811.062/2-1962; Grey to Maudling, 20 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161948. 
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The crisis ended the possibility of a US accommodation with Jagan, 
because within days the state department was assuming that Jagan's sus­
picions of the United States made one impracticable. The British ambas­
sador at Washington, Sir David Ormsby Gore, reported on 19 February 
that Kennedy, the previous day, had 'hoped that these [events] might 
enable us to reconsider the date of independence and also the possibility of 
requiring a further general election before independence was finally 
granted'.1 The same day, Rusk suggested to Home that the United States 
and Britain should re-examine the premise 'that there was no reasonable 
alternative to working with Jagan', because he had 'reached the conclusion 
that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana 
under Jagan'. Home did as Rusk asked. In a minute for the cabinet of 21 
February, the foreign office proposed that Britain should appease the 
United States by agreeing to discuss the possibility of holding new elec­
tions in British Guiana before independence. Thus, the disturbances set 
the stage for die re-evaluation of both US and British policy at the prompt­
ing of the CIA with die collusion of the state department.2 
Although Rusk claimed that Jagan and 'persons closely associated with 
him' had Communist connections, he admitted that he was bowing before 
the pressure of US public opinion.3 The antipathy to Jagan ran deeply 
among members of Congress, the CIA, and labour union officials: die state 
department, which received 113 Congressional letters and 2,400 letters 
from die general public expressing opposition to Jagan, wondered whether 
labour unions, companies widi investments in British Guiana, and right-
wing groups would oppose the administration if it continued to work with 
him.4 Even before his visit to die United States in October 1961, Dodd and 
Gruening had written to Kennedy to oppose World Bank loans for British 
Guiana. Congressman John H. Rousselot had cabled Kennedy in Novem­
ber 1961 to 'go on record as being unswervingly opposed to aid of any kind 
to Cheddi Jagan and his Marxist-Socialist-Communist Government'.5 He 
was echoed by Congressswoman Edna Kelly.6 Earlier, Rousselot had 
called on Kennedy to endorse D'Aguiar in the general election, which 
Jagan described as intervention in the colony's internal affairs. That Kelly 
1 Ormsby Gore to FO, tel., 19 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161947 A10110/27. 
2 Hankey, minute 'British Guiana', 21 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161947. Schlesinger indicated in 1994 that 'the 
British thought that we were overreacting, and indeed we were. The CIA decided this was some great 
menace, and they got the bit between their teeth': T. Weiner, 'A Kennedy-CIA Plot Returns to Haunt 
Clinton', New York Times, 20 Oct. 1994. 
3 State dept. to embassy, London, tel., 19 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 544-5. 
* Paper prepared in the state dept., 15 March 1962, ibid., pp. 555-8. 
5 Dodd and Gruening to Kennedy, 6 Sept. 1961, Rousselot to Kennedy, 6 Nov. 1961, JFKL, WHCF, 
box 43. 
6 O'Brien to Kelly, 7 Nov. 1961, ibid. 
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and Dodd were Democrats, whereas Rousselot and Gruening were Repub­
licans, attests to the bipartisan antipathy towards Jagan, which was serious 
enough to jeopardize aid to other countries. Congress even criticized the 
AID mission sent to determine whether British Guiana was eligible for US 
aid, and was only placated with the explanation that die mission's purpose 
was to facilitate the entry of CIA agents into British Guiana.1 Once anti-
Communist hysteria closed the avenues for debate about Jagan within the 
Kennedy administration, the CIA was determined to undermine him. 
Home saw litde reason for Rusk's push to get rid of Jagan, nor for 
Britain to single out British Guiana for special treatment, given the other 
colonies in which plans for Britain's withdrawal had led to political crisis. 
He reminded Rusk that owing to the US advocacy of decolonization, 'pre­
mature independence' was a gift that had been handed to the 'Commun­
ists'.2 The British, who preferred to deal with Jagan than with Burnham, 
saw litde chance of his government being unseated in another election. 
They reminded Rusk that Jagan was litde more than a tea-party socialist 
or, in Iain MacLeod's words, 'a naïve London School of Economics Marx­
ist filled with charm, personal honesty, and juvenile nationalism'.3 During 
his visit to the United States, Jagan had acknowledged in a conversation at 
Schlesinger's home that he and his government believed in socialism 'but 
they are democratic socialists'.4 The British were impatient with US pres­
sure to solve a problem that had its roots in US domestic politics. Maud-
ling explained that as Britain wished to withdraw from British Guiana as 
expeditiously as possible, it would be happy to see die United States take 
over die responsibility.5 
Notwidistanding the British response, bodi die state department and the 
CIA were of the view diat 'a firm decision had been taken to get rid of die 
Jagan government.'6 However, Kennedy wanted to ensure that die British 
would co-operate and, on 8 March, he told Rusk: 
No final decision will be taken on our policy to British Guiana and the Jagan 
government until (a) the Secretary of State has a chance to discuss the matter with 
Lord Home in Geneva, and (b) Hugh Fraser [under-secretary for the colonies] 
completes his on-the-spot survey in British Guiana for the Colonial Office. The 
questions which we must answer before we reach our decision include the 
following: 1. Can Great Britain be persuaded to delay independence for a year? 2. 
1 Interview of Hamilton by Bayel, 18 Aug. 1964, JFKL, Oral History Project. 
2 Home to Rusk, 26 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 546-8. 
3 Memo, Schlesinger to Bruce, 27 Feb. 1962, ibid., p. 549. 
4 R. J. Alexander, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Governors of the English-Speaking Caribbean and 
Puerto Rico: Conversations and Correspondence (Westport, 1997), pp. 205-9. 
5 Memo, Schlesinger to Bruce, 27 Feb. 1962, FRUS,ig6i-3, xii. 549. 
6 Memo, Schlesinger to Kennedy, 8 March 1962, ibid., p. 548. 
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If Great Britain refuses to delay the date of independence, would a new election 
before independence be possible? If so, would Jagan win or lose? If he lost, what 
are the alternatives? 3. What are the possibilities and limitations of United States 
action in the situation?1 
The meeting between Rusk and Home in Geneva in March 1962 set the 
stage for the British government's abandonment of Jagan. According to 
Rusk, Home acknowledged that 'Britain must not leave behind another 
Castro situation in the hemisphere.' Britain, therefore, would set up a com­
mission of inquiry to study the causes of the recent disorders in British 
Guiana which would postpone independence and 'muddy [the] situation 
sufficiently to reopen Britain's present commitments as to schedule'.2 Rusk 
reported that, although Home was not yet ready to agree to covert action, 
he did agree that such action might become necessary. Home had decided 
to give way to the US demand for a compliant government in British 
Guiana as long as Britain controlled the timing and the tactics. Jagan's fate 
was sealed. 
In a meeting with state department and White House officials on 16 
March following his tour of British Guiana, Hugh Fraser explained that 
because of the racial polarization between the Indian and African com­
munities, he was thinking of introducing constitutional protection for the 
rights of minorities and perhaps proportional representation. He reiterated 
the view mat Jagan was not a Communist, and suggested that politically he 
was now so weak diat US aid would tie the colony to die West. His audi­
ence disagreed. Johnson reminded Fraser that die United States viewed 
events in British Guiana through the prism of its experience in Cuba: 
'Castro had originally been presented as a reformer. We do not intend to 
be taken in twice.' White House assistants Ralph Dungan and Schlesinger 
stressed the domestic influences on US foreign policy: aid to Jagan would 
jeopardize the administration's foreign aid bill, but prospects would im­
prove 'if some other figure were to arise as the leader of British Guiana'.3 
In suggesting that the United States should work with Jagan, Fraser, 
who spoke for the colonial office, was apparendy unaware of Home's 
agreement with Rusk, of which few other officials may have known. The 
national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, referred in March 1964 to die 
agreement in a memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson. In 1967, 
the London Sunday Times disclosed that the British government had sanc­
tioned the CIA's activities in British Guiana in 1963, although only 
Macmillan; the colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, who had replaced 
1 National Security Action memo, no. 135, Kennedy to Rusk, 8 March 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 551. 
2 Rusk to state dept., tel., 13 March 1962, ibid., p. 553. 
3 Memo of con., 17 March 1962, ibid., pp. 558-64. 
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Maudling in August 1962; and the head of the British security service, were 
privy.1 The Geneva meeting set the stage for a co-ordinated covert action 
programme to force Jagan from office. 
Immediately after the meeting between Home and Rusk, the work to 
remove Jagan gained momentum. In March 1962, Burdett paid a visit to 
British Guiana during which he met a cross-section of opinion, including 
members of the PPP, the opposition parties and the PNC's leader, Burn-
ham, and influential members of the private sector. Grey, in a meeting with 
Burdett and Melby, said that Jagan 'would make a real effort obtain eco­
nomic aid from Soviet bloc'.2 No further evidence was needed by the Ken­
nedy administration to justify its stance towards British Guiana and search 
for someone to replace Jagan. 
When Burnham visited the United States in May 1962 to attend the 
United Nations, he was invited to the state department.3 And although 
Schlesinger prevented him from meeting Kennedy, he met with Dodd, 
who communicated to Kennedy the substance of their conversation. It 
centred on the possibilities of provoking a split in the PPP and creating an 
anti-Jagan coalition that could win new elections before independence. In 
the wake of the unrest in February, Burnham had suggested to Grey that 
Jagan might resign, to be replaced by the minister of home affairs, Balram 
Singh Rai, with PNC support.4 
During Burnham's meeting with Schlesinger and senior state depart­
ment officials on 3 May, he explained that the opposition parties in British 
Guiana were demanding proportional representation and that everyone, 
including the PPP, recognized that new elections would have to be held 
before independence. Two days later, he met Johnson over lunch with 
Teodoro Moscoso, the US co-ordinator for the Alliance for Progress; the 
deputy assistant secretary for international affairs in the labour department, 
Harry Weiss; Schlesinger; Richard Goodwin, a White House assistant; 
and Serafino Romualdi of die AFL-CIO.5 
Burnham's visit to Washington confirmed his status as the preferred 
alternative to Jagan. According to Burdett, 'Burnham was unemotional and 
precise and made a good impression.'6 Although the administration 
wondered whether supporting him might be construed as anti-Indian 
1 See memo for president, 2 March 1964, memos of Bundy to Johnson, 1963-6 [Frederick, Md.], 
University Press of America, microfilm, reel 1, memos of the special asst. for national security affairs; 
'Macmillan, Sandys Backed CIA's Anti-Jagan Plot', Sunday Times, 23 April 1967. 
2 'Jagan Agrees He Fits Description of a Red', New York TÏTTUS, 23 June 1962; Melby to Rusk, tel., 27 
March 1962, SDDF 741D.00/3-2662. 
3 Memo of con., 3 May 1962, SDDF 741D.00/5-362. 
+ Grey to Rusk, tel., 19 Feb. 1962, FO 371/161947. 
5 Memo of con., 3 May 1962, SDDF 741D. 00/5-362; memo of con., 5 May 1962, SDDF 741D. 00/5-562. 
6 Burdett to embassy, London, tel., 7 May 1962, SDDF 741D.00/5-7627. 
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sentiment,1 the high-profile opposition to the Jagans of Ishmael, the Indo-
Guyanese leader of the MPCA, provided evidence that the anti-Jagan 
coalition was not anti-Indian, as did Rai's participation in the anti-Jagan 
manoeuvres. 
Not everyone was convinced of Burnham's suitability. Harry Hoffman, a 
member of the long-awaited economic mission which was conducting its 
study of the political and economic situation, remarked that 'there is 
considerable feeling here, which I am inclined to share, that British Guiana 
would be worse off with Burnham than with Jagan.52 However prescient, 
such sceptical assessments were drowned out in the rush to find an alter­
native. The administration soon decided that Rai - the possible alternative 
as leader of the Indian community - was unlikely to defeat Jagan in an elec­
tion. That left Burnham. In September 1962, Dodd complained to Rusk 
that the state department was reluctant to authorize a housing project in 
British Guiana to be financed by die United States for the benefit of Burn­
ham, who should be given credit for his role in obtaining US scholarships 
for British Guyanese students. Dodd, keen to buttress Burnham's political 
stature, volunteered to issue a statement affirming Burnham's role in the 
scholarship program.3 
The US trade union movement also backed Burnham. In 1961, 
Romualdi, whose antipathy to Jagan had been evident from the early 
1950s, had become the director of the American Institute for Free Labor 
Development (AIFLD), an organization funded by the US government 
dirough AID to train pro-American trade union officials in foreign coun­
tries. In September 1962, he reported that 'die trade union movement in 
British Guiana - supported by the ORIT-ICFTU, and most emphatically 
by dieir US affiliates - rejects the theory that there is no alternative to the 
regime of Dr Jagan.' Similarly, the vice-president of die AFL-CIO, William 
C. Doherty, wrote to die US vice-president, Lyndon Johnson, to express 
support for Burnham and urge the state department and AID to give 
scholarships and loans for housing to the anti-Jagan forces in British 
Guiana. According to Doherty, 'Mr Burnham and die PNC represent the 
democratic movement in British Guiana and I am most anxious to assist in 
achieving their legitimate objectives.'4 Thus, the choice of Burnham as the 
alternative to Jagan was endorsed by a wide range of people with close ties 
to the Kennedy administration. 
The British followed suit. In June 1962, Macmillan told Kennedy that 
1 Dutton to Johnson, 20 July 1962, SDDF 741D.00/6-2662. 
2 Memo, Schlesinger to Kennedy, 21 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 572-3. 
3 Dodd to Rusk, 17 Sept. 1962, JFKL, WHCF, British Guiana, box 236. 
* Report, 'More about Cheddi Jagan', Romualdi, 17 Sept. 1962, JFKL, Schlesinger WH Files, writings, 
box W-3; Doherty to Johnson, 21 June 1962, SDDF 741D.00/6-2662. 
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the British had decided to rethink their timetable for independence for 
British Guiana, and would 'try to persuade the leaders of the political 
parties to agree that elections should be held before the territory becomes 
independent. This will give us a little more time and also, perhaps a further 
opportunity to establish whether, under a democratic system, there is any 
alternative to Dr Jagan's government.' Here was a clear endorsement by the 
British government of Home's agreement with Rusk.1 
Although key members of the White House staff remained unconvinced, 
Kennedy, too, had signed on to Rusk's plan. Bundy and Schlesinger 
agreed with the state department's reasoning about the need to force Jagan 
from office, but wondered whedier the CIA 'knows how to manipulate an 
election without a backfire' and whether Rusk would be able to persuade 
the British to back the US plans.2 Kennedy, however, had told Ormsby 
Gore in late July that he was glad that Britain was going to press for new 
elections, which 'would provide opportunity for government of different 
complexion to come into power through democratic processes'. He added 
that the assessment of projects to be financed by US development would 
continue, to ensure uiat the preliminary work would be done 'by the time a 
new government comes to power in B[ritish] G[uiana]'.3 
The British government, for its part, had kept Home's promise that the 
commission of inquiry would be used to slow and redirect the transfer of 
power. It postponed the conference on independence for British Guiana 
from May to October pending the commission's report. On 10 September, 
Maudling's successor, Duncan Sandys, suggested to Macmillan how they 
might unseat Jagan's PPP government. The conference should be 'allowed 
to break down over the issue of proportional representation and certain 
other matters on which the parties are disagreed'. The colony's leaders 
would be recommended to open talks at home with the expectation that 
they, too, would fail. Sandys would then propose a referendum on propor­
tional representation which the opposition parties were likely to win; new 
elections would have to be held; and after the elections, die conference 
would reconvene. Sandys told Macmillan that the 'Americans should be 
informed in strictest confidence of this plan, so that they may give such 
support as they think fit to Burnham.'4 
Macmillan told Ormsby Gore to tell Kennedy of the plan in confidence, 
including the possibility that Sandys might invite Burnham to head a 
government to conduct the referendum. 'Please impress on the President 
that no one at all knows of this plan and that it will be quite disastrous if it 
1 State dept. to embassy, London, tel., 7 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 569-71. 
2 Memo, Bundy to Kennedy, 13 July, memo, Schlesinger to Dungan, 19 July 1962,ibid., pp. 577-8. 
3 State dept. to embassy, London, draft tel., n.d., ibid., p . 579. 
4 Minute, Sandys to Macmillan, 10 Sept 1962, FO 371/161957. 
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were to leak out.'1 By endorsing the Kennedy administration's choice of 
Burnham as the leader of independent Guyana, Sandys' plan showed that 
British Guiana was passing from 'formal' colonial rule under the British 
into the 'informal' US empire in the Caribbean. It showed how the New 
Frontier supplanted Britain's sway over the West Indian territories. 
Britain's deference to the United States became more evident during 
Burnham's second visit to Washington in early September 1962, to explore 
US support for a possible PNC-PPP coalition government. He had dis­
cussed this with Grey, who warned Ormsby Gore, who in turn asked the 
state department to warn Burnham that the United States would refuse aid 
to any government which included Jagan. Burnham was left with no choice 
but die UF. He told the state department on 14 September that under pro­
portional representation, the PNC and UF would win a majority and form 
a coalition government.2 Thus, the Macmillan government and the Ken­
nedy administration closed the door to the only government likely to keep 
the simmering racial tension under control by denying the PPP a role com­
mensurate with its share of die popular vote. 
The extent of Jagan's isolation had become evident in die hearings in 
May and June before the commission of inquiry (Sir Henry Wynn Parry, 
chair, Sir Edward Asafu-Adjaye of Ghana, and G. D. Khosla of India). 
During his testimony, Jagan acknowledged his admiration for Castro and 
Nikita Khrushchev and admitted diat he could be considered a Commun­
ist, but he also stated diat he had no intention of copying Castro's policies.3 
The testimony, which confirmed the British assessment of Jagan as naïve, 
was used against him widi telling effect: Dodd inserted it into the Congres­
sional Record along widi praise of die administration for refusing aid. The 
commission, which released its report in early October, attributed die riots 
to the fear of Communist tendencies on the part of the PPP government. 
The report minimized the significance of racial tensions and dismissed the 
idea of a plot to overthrow the government: die unrest Svas comparable to 
an act of spontaneous combustion when some highly fermented substance 
is subjected to long pressures. The mass of discontented and idle workers 
on strike was inexorably driven by the sheer force of bored monotony to 
find release in rowdyism and rioting.'4 Thus, the report 'muddied the 
situation'. It contradicted Fraser, who had emphasized die ethnic tensions, 
and obscured the role of die CIA. It not only delayed die plans for inde-
1 Macmillan to Ormsby Gore, tel., personal, n.d., FO 371/161957. 
2 Grey to Piper, 2 Oct. 1962, FO 371/161958; memo of con., 7 Sept. 1962, SDDF 741D. 00/9-762; memo 
of con., 14 Sept. 1962, SDDF 741D.00/9-1462. 
3 Melby to state dept., tel., 8 July 1962, SDDF 741D.00/7-862. 
* 'Report of a commission of inquiry into disturbances in British Guiana in Feb. 1962', Colonial No. 
354 (London, 1962), pp. 60-2. 
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pendence, as Home had promised Rusk, but also made Jagan's willingness 
to seek ties widi the Communist countries die central issue in determining 
the future of the colony. 
Even before the report's release, Kennedy and Home met in Washington 
in September to discuss Anglo-American co-operation against the 'Com­
munist' threat in the Caribbean. Home revealed that Britain was unwilling 
to impose restrictions on British trade with Cuba, but admitted that Jagan's 
decision to increase economic and political ties with Cuba was a cause for 
concern. He agreed that Britain would help in 'patrolling of the Caribbean 
against the movement of arms or agents from Cuba, particularly in the 
direction of British Guiana'.1 The meeting had included Rusk, die under­
secretary, George Ball, Ormsby Gore, and Bruce. It would seem that one 
objective of the meeting was to agree upon Sandys' plan as the basis for 
joint policy towards British Guiana. 
When British Guiana's political leaders arrived in London for the post­
poned talks about independence on 23 October, the PPP demanded a 
timetable: the PNC and UF, now co-operating, demanded elections under 
proportional representation prior to independence. After two weeks of 
deadlock, the talks were broken off, and Sandys announced that they 
would resume in Georgetown with Grey in the chair; that, unless some 
agreement were reached, the British government would impose a solution.2 
His plan to deadlock die conference had worked to perfection. The claim 
of die PPP, now paralysed, to being die most effective successor to British 
colonial rule and its ability to govern were being undermined; die forces 
arrayed against it were made up of the opposition parties which repre­
sented a majority of the population, the Kennedy administration, and the 
British government. In agreeing to participate in talks chaired by Grey, the 
PPP government was tacitly admitting its need for British support and 
agreement with die opposition parties. It was unlikely to be given either, as 
its opponents knew that its days in office were numbered. Nonetheless, the 
PPP refused to resign and pave die way for elections. 
In March 1963, Bundy, in an attempt to keep up the pressure on Britain 
to oust Jagan, asked Ormsby Gore to clarify Britain's policy in British 
Guiana.3 When Sandys replied that Britain was not yet ready to break the 
political deadlock, the state department told Hennings that it would 
discuss British Guiana widi Harold Wilson, the leader of die Labour Party, 
when he visited Washington in March.4 The Kennedy administration was 
1 'President Meets with Lord Home on Curbing Cuba', New York Times, 1 Oct. 1962. 
2 'Parley on Guiana Ends in Deadlock', New York Times, 7 Nov. 1962. For the text of the press release, 
see FO 371/161959. 
3 Ormsby Gore to FO, tel., 15 March 1963, FO 371/167689. 
4 FO to embassy, Washington, tel., 27 March, Killick to Slater, 20 March 1963, ibid. 
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taking steps, which proved successful, to ensure that if Labour won the 
next election in Britain, it would stick by Sandys' plan. In the meantime, 
however, it had to keep the Conservatives up to the mark. 
In late March, the PPP had introduced a Labour Relations Bill, pat­
terned on the Wagner Act in the United States, which allowed for balloting 
by workers to determine union representation.1 Although ostensibly in­
tended to setde recognition disputes, the bill's immediate aim was to re­
place the MPCA - a major source of support for the opposition parties 
whose ties with British and US trades unions enabled it to function as a 
conduit to Jagan's opponents overseas - with the PPP-controlled Guyana 
Industrial and Agricultural Workers' Union (GAWU), as the dominant 
group in the BGTUC. The anti-PPP coalition countered by calling a gen­
eral strike obeyed by most of the unions which they controlled, including 
die Civil Service Association to which most senior civil servants belonged. 
In the sugar industry, employers imposed a lockout which effectively 
prevented PPP supporters from demonstrating their opposition to the 
strike. Except for essential services, the colony was effectively crippled. US 
and British trade unions reportedly helped to finance the strike to the tune 
of $50,000 to $70,000 per week, the AIFLD sent organizers to help co­
ordinate activity, and, as in February 1962, the Public Service Inter­
national, allegedly a CIA front, was also reportedly involved.2 The level of 
Anglo-American support for the anti-PPP forces undoubtedly reflected the 
participation of both the British and US intelligence services, as the two 
most senior British security officials, together with Sandys and Macmillan, 
had authorized the CIA's activities. 
On 9 May, the governor, at Jagan's request, declared a state of emer­
gency. Jagan also offered his resignation on condition that elections were 
held under the existing electoral system and that independence be given to 
the winner, demands that he knew would find few takers. He then turned 
to Cuba and the Soviet Union for food and fuel, and in order to store the 
fuel Cuba supplied, took over the storage facilities of the Shell Oil Com­
pany, after the state department refused to allow die fuel to be stored at die 
airport in an area leased to die United States in 1940.3 
Although it is unclear whether the Cuban-Soviet aid which arrived in 
mid-June prompted Britain's efforts to negotiate an end to the strike, the 
Kennedy administration left the British in no doubt diat it saw the aid as a 
1 Jagan, 'Letter to the Editor', New York Times, 28 June 1963. 
2 'Guiana Labor Uneasy', New York Times, 7 July 1963; 'CIA men Aided Strikes in Guiana against Dr 
Jagan', New York Times, 22 Feb. 1967; Romualdi to Dungan, igjuly 1963,JFKL, WHCF, box 43. In 
this letter, Romualdi revealed that, after his visit to British Guiana in April 1962, AIFLD decided to 
extend support to the anti-Jagan BGTUC. 
3 '7 Shell Oil Tanks Seized by Guiana', New York Times, 23 June 1963. 
6o6 Cary Fraser 
harbinger of greater Cuban and Soviet involvement in British Guiana after 
independence.1 On 2 9 June, Britain sent a trade union official, Robert 
Willis, to Georgetown to mediate. The anti-PPP unions only agreed to 
mediation, however, when it became clear that their foreign aid was in 
jeopardy. The PPP, on the other hand, had raised a US$1 million loan 
from its own commercial arm which had contracted to supply railway 
sleepers and other goods to Cuba. When the British government approved 
the loan, the Kennedy administration, which objected, urged them to re­
consider. The foreign office replied that it had no power to prevent it, as 
the loan had not been contracted by the government but by the PPP's 
commercial arm. In addition, under the terms of the 1961 constitution 
conferring internal self-government on British Guiana, the governor lacked 
die constitutional authority to block the transaction.2 
Whatever the reasons for the settlement, the strike caused a serious dis­
agreement between the Macmillan government and the Kennedy adminis­
tration, which was offended at the sight of Cuban and Russian ships 
bringing supplies to British Guiana under the protection of elite British 
troops. They were also upset when Sandys told the house of commons on 
19 June that 'die struggle is now more political than industrial and it has 
become clear that the two sides are evenly balanced.' To the Kennedy ad­
ministration, the statement was 'not only a misrepresentation of the nature 
of the strike, but illustrates the unwillingness of the UK to cope with the 
Jagan Government'. The differences in approach had become 'a major 
policy issue between the United States and Great Britain', and Kennedy, 
who was due to meet Macmillan in Britain in late June, viewed 'British 
Guiana as the most important topic he has to discuss'.3 
Rusk told Bruce to warn die British that Kennedy attached great import­
ance to 'reaching understanding with UK on Bridsh Guiana. This is prin­
cipal subject President intends raise with Macmillan at Birch Grove and is 
main reason for my talks in London with Home and Sandys.' As the 
United States did not want Britain to transfer power widiout first removing 
Jagan from office, Rusk claimed that Macmillan was reneging on the agree­
ment to remove him and had 'reverted to view UK should wash its hands 
of British Guiana by granting early independence, leaving the mess on our 
doorstep'. For this reason, Home should take part in the planned talks, as 
British Guiana was 'not just a colonial problem but one with the highest 
foreign policy implications'. 
As the United States expected to determine the conduct of the British as 
1 'Guiana's Labor Uneasy', New York Times, 7 July 1963. 
2 FO to embassy, Washington, tel., 24 July 1963, FO 371/167689. 
3 Memo for the record, with attachment, 21 June 1963, FRUS, ip6"i-3,xii. 604-5. 
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well as the British Guyanese government, Rusk told Bruce to ensure that 
the Labour Party's leaders backed the US goals in British Guiana prior to 
their expected return to power.1 As Bundy put it the next year, Harold 
Wilson 'should be told as clearly as Douglas Home was that die US cannot 
accept another Communist state in tins hemisphere. He expects to hear 
this, and has said that he will be able to meet us pretty well.'2 When 
Labour's foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, visited Washington in 
October, he was expected to agree to the continuation of the Sandys plan. 
In July 1965, in an even more pointed reference to the collaboration, a state 
department memorandum explained to Rusk die purpose of a meeting 
requested by the foreign office: 'Sir Patrick [Gordon Walker] is expected 
to advise you officially that the British government agrees to authorize 
continued covert assistance to the anti-Jagan parties in British Guiana ... 
He may also express the hope diat the cooperation now existing between 
our intelligence services will be continued.'3 British Guiana had become an 
avenue through which joint Anglo-American intelligence and covert activ­
ities were being institutionalized. 
At the meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan in June 1963, Britain 
explained diat it was reluctant to resume direct rule over British Guiana 
because it would be expected to do die same in Southern Rhodesia. While 
willing to introduce proportional representation and to transfer power to a 
Burnham-D'Aguiar government, Britain required a guarantee of unequivo­
cal US support if it reimposed direct rule to facilitate the removal of Jagan. 
Kennedy feared that Jagan's survival might determine the outcome of the 
next presidential election: 
The great danger in 1964 was that, since Cuba would be the major American pub­
lic issue, adding British Guiana to Cuba could well tip the scales, and someone 
would be elected who would take military action against Cuba. He said that the 
American people would not stand for a situation which looked as though the 
Soviet Union had leapfrogged over Cuba to land on the continent in the Western 
Hemisphere.4 
The meeting resolved the differences between the United States and 
Britain, and allowed them to proceed with the Sandys plan as the basis of 
the joint strategy to oust Jagan. Upon his return to the United States, Ken­
nedy therefore announced in a letter to Jagan on 6 July his decision to 
1 State dept. to embassy, London, tel., 21 June 1963, FRUS, io6"i-3, xii. 605-6. 
2 Bundy, memo for president, 'Subjects for Discussion with Wilson other dian MLF', 6 Dec. 1964, 
Austin, Lyndon B.Johnson Library, National Security File, country file, box 214. 
3 See briefing book, visit of Gordon Walker, 26-27 OcL 1964, Declassified Documents Quarterly Cata­
logue, v, no. 4 (1979), State Department 451B; and memo, Davis to sec , 9 July 1965, ibid., iii, no. 2 
(1977), State Department 116B. 
4 Memo of con., 30 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-3, xii. 604-5. 
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refuse aid to the PPP government. The decision was attributed to US dis­
approval of Jagan's willingness to seek ties with the 'communist world, in­
cluding Cuba', and the futility of aid 'until die impasse in British Guiana's 
political and racial quarrels is solved'.1 
After the end of the strike in July, Sandys visited Georgetown to encour­
age Jagan and Burnham to discuss a coalition government. He was trying 
to ensure that Britain was not criticized for the political impasse it had 
caused prior to delivering the coup de grâce to Jagan. Upon his return, 
Sandys announced that he had given the PPP and PNC until October to 
reach an agreement; failing that, the British government would impose a 
solution. 
By late September, the talks between the PPP and the PNC had failed, 
owing to die PNC's demand for proportional representation and die PPP's 
refusal to accept it. The PNC demanded an equal number of cabinet posts 
in a coalition government, despite its lower share of the popular vote, 
because of its perception that die PPP was vulnerable and certain it would 
refuse.2 Jagan own sense of die PPP's vulnerability may explain his meeting 
with Melby on 5 September to find a way to halt the deterioration in rela­
tions between his government and the United States. Rusk merely told 
Melby 'to avoid creating any impression, or enabling die PPP to do so, uiat 
diere exists real possibility of improving relations'.3 
The call on Kennedy in September by the Republican leadership in 
Congress to pressure the British into withholding independence from Brit­
ish Guiana was further ammunition for the anti-Jagan forces.4 It strength­
ened the administration's hand, because by showing that its stance had 
bipartisan support, it enabled Kennedy to prevent the Republicans from 
using British Guiana as an issue in the presidential election. By late 1963, 
the administration had used the Sandys plan to defuse the potentially 
explosive impact of British Guiana upon US domestic politics. 
The failure of the talks between the PPP and the PNC led to new talks in 
London under Sandys scheduled for late October. During a stopover in 
New York on the way to London, Burnham and D'Aguiar said that the 
talks would only result in an imposed solution. When die talks deadlocked, 
they sent a joint letter to Sandys: 'We agreed to ask the British Govern­
ment to setde on their audiority all outstanding constitutional issues, and 
we undertake to accept dieir decisions.'5 Sandys' solution was a new con­
stitution and proportional representation, elections, and independence 
1 'Kennedy Refuses Aid to Guiana; Ties to Reds Termed Reason', New York Times, 9 July 1963. 
2 Melby to state dept., tel., 5 Sept. 1963, FRUS, 7961-3, xii. 610-11. 
3 Rusk to Melby, tel., 7 Sept. 1963, ibid. 
4 'Republicans in Washington Fight Guiana Independence', New York Times, 27 Sept. 1963. 
5 FO to mission, United Nations, tel., 25 Oct. 1963, FO 371/167689. 
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postponed until afterwards. His plan had finally borne its fruit. The 
ground was laid for the removal of Jagan by a constitutional process that 
would both save Britain from international opprobrium and achieve the 
Kennedy administration's objectives. Jagan, who accused Britain of sub­
servience to the United States, declared the PPP free to reject Sandys' 
solution. He told the new prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who 
had succeeded Macmillan in October, that: 'The Colonial Secretary has 
used divisions and differences in British Guiana as excuses for altering the 
constitution and rigging the election ... Mr Sandys' decision came as a 
shock. It is incomprehensible and unprincipled.'1 Although Home sup­
ported Sandys, he later acknowledged that 'it had even been slightly awk­
ward. Dr Jagan had given so little trouble.'2 
The following year was marked by a return to sporadic violence in 
British Guiana as preparations were made for the elections. Jagan's efforts 
to mobilize support within the United Nations and the British Labour 
Party proved futile. In December 1964, the elections brought a PNC-UF 
coalition to power, which led the country to independence in May 1966 
underpinned by the promise of substantial US aid. 
* * * 
British Guiana proved to be emblematic of the 'imperialism of decolon­
ization'. In 1961, Britain was preparing to transfer power to the PPP 
government. By 1964, it had not only abandoned the PPP, it had also 
deferred to the Kennedy administration's demand to replace the PPP with 
a PNC-UF coalition and had ceded its control over events in the colony to 
the United States. Having shed the trappings of formal empire, the new 
country, Guyana, found its autonomy circumscribed as the New Frontier 
picked up where the British Empire left off. The United States was the 
critical determinant of both British policy and the post-imperial dispen­
sation, and its influence expanded in the colony both during and after the 
transfer of power to the Guyanese nationalist movement. 
British Guiana also illustrates the impact of British imperial disengage­
ment upon domestic politics in the United States. In the wake of the 
Cuban revolution and the Cuban missile crisis, independence for British 
Guiana under die PPP might have triggered an ouuourst of anti-Commun­
ist hysteria that would have swept the Democratic administration from 
power in 1964. That fear of the consequences ofjagan's survival in British 
Guiana helps to explain the intense pressure brought to bear on the British 
1 Jagan to Macraillan, 7 Nov. 1963, FO 371/167689; 'Britain Demands Proportional Election in Guiana', 
New York Times, 1 Nov. 1963. 
2 Record of cen. at embassy, Washington, 26 Nov. 1963, FO 371/167690. 
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government to ensure that a post-imperial dispensation in Guyana would 
accommodate US preferences, thus helping to contain the rabid anti-Com­
munist hysteria within the United States. In effect, the Anglo-American 
relationship was, in the case of British Guiana, instrumental in the Ken­
nedy administration's management of domestic US politics. 
Louis and Robinson point to the importance of exploring the evolution 
of the Anglo-American relationship as a mechanism for analysing the pro­
cess of British imperial disengagement after 1945, which transcends the 
focus on the conflict/collaboration among metropolitan and colonial/ 
national interest groups, and shows how the boundaries of the informal 
empire of die United States were extended. The New Frontier pushed for­
wards as the British Empire fell back. Nowhere in the Caribbean was this 
illustrated more clearly than during the transfer of power in British Guiana. 
Jagan's return to power in 1992, after an election overseen by die former 
president of die United States, Jimmy Carter, and an international team of 
observers, was a powerful commentary on the achievements of the New 
Fronder. With the end of the cold war, and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the United States could find an accommodation with the 'Com­
munist' political leadership in Guyana that it had sought to destroy diree 
decades before, in its search for ideological conformity and the expansion 
of its informal empire in the Western Hemisphere. 
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